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AVOIDING THE AVOID: RE-SECURING THE MORTGAGE 
LENDER POST-BFP 
ABSTRACT 
The Supreme Court’s decision in BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp. was 
intended to end the debate over what constitutes “reasonably equivalent 
value” pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 548(a) with respect to foreclosure sales. In 
BFP, the Court held that the consideration received at a foreclosure sale is, in 
itself, reasonably equivalent value and rejected a minimum threshold amount. 
In its attempt to clarify the law, the Court left open the option for a bankruptcy 
trustee to avoid a foreclosure sale based on a lack of state law compliance. As 
shown in this Comment, state foreclosure laws vary drastically, and relying on 
state law compliance undermines the uniform application of the Bankruptcy 
Code. 
First, this Comment compares the decision in BFP and its predecessors 
with the legislative intent behind the various fraudulent transfer acts and § 548 
of the Bankruptcy Code. Second, this Comment further proposes amending the 
Bankruptcy Code to require a trustee seeking avoidance of a real estate 
transfer to show a lack of substantial compliance with state real estate 
foreclosure laws and to expressly exempt foreclosure sales from § 548’s 
reasonably equivalent value requirement. Finally, this Comment proposes 
needed definitions in § 101 of the Bankruptcy Code including definitions for 
“reasonably equivalent value” and “real estate foreclosure sale.” This 
solution would not only codify the decision in BFP, but would also clear up the 
numerous inconsistencies in the trustee avoidance powers based on the 
drastically different state foreclosure laws and promote uniform application of 
the Bankruptcy Code. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The current practice of allowing a trustee to avoid a prepetition foreclosure 
sale based on lack of state law compliance and the lack of an expressly defined 
federal standard for “reasonably equivalent value” under the constructive fraud 
provision of § 548 of the Bankruptcy Code1 (the “Code”) lead to enormous 
inconsistencies in the avoidance powers of the bankruptcy trustee. These 
inconsistencies stand in direct contradiction with Congress’s intentions in 
drafting these provisions of the Code. Congress, in its 1984 and 2005 
amendments, gave additional protection to creditors and attempted to prevent 
debtor abuse.2 This intended creditor protection, coupled with other Code 
provisions,3 proves Congress’s intent not to hinder a secured creditor’s ability 
to secure its collateral. The United States Supreme Court’s decision in BFP v. 
Resolution Trust Corp. reflects this same intent to give protection to lenders for 
noncollusive foreclosure sales in determining constructive fraud under § 548.4 
As the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held in Bundles v. Baker (In re 
Bundles),5 Congress’s intentional use of a federal standard made clear that it 
did not believe relying on state foreclosure law to avoid a transfer would 
protect federal interests.6 The later decision in BFP provided a federal standard 
for determining reasonably equivalent value in foreclosure sales, but left 
outstanding the frequently occurring and inconsistent practice of avoiding 
 
 1 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1) (2012). The Code describes the trustee’s power to avoid a transfer in property, 
stating, 
The trustee . . . may avoid any transfer . . . of an interest of the debtor in property, or any 
obligation . . . incurred by the debtor, that was made or incurred on or within 2 years before the 
date of the filing of the petition, if the debtor voluntarily or involuntarily . . . (B)(i) received less 
than a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for such transfer or obligation . . . . 
Id. 
 2 See Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 
23; 130 CONG. REC. H7497 (daily ed. June 29, 1984) (statement of Rep. Brooks) (praising the 1984 
Amendments for “eliminating the use of the bankruptcy system by debtors who are not suffering economic 
hardship”). The 1984 Amendments were intended to “stop[] consumer abuse of the Code. Critics of the 1978 
Code believed that debtors abused the Code’s liberal provisions to discharge payable debts.” Anne 
McLaughlin, Note, Tithing in a Chapter 13 Plan: The Requirement of Reasonableness Under the Religious 
Liberty and Charitable Donation Protection Act, 47 B.C. L. REV 375, 379 (2006).  
 3 See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) (preventing modification of the rights of secured creditors with a security 
interest in real property that is the debtor’s principal residence); id. § 1325 (providing the “cramdown” 
exemption, which protects the secured creditor’s right to payment). 
 4 See 511 U.S. 531 (1994). 
 5 856 F.2d 815 (7th Cir. 1988). 
 6 See id. at 824 (“Congress’s conscious use of a federal standard suggests that it did not believe that the 
expedient of relying entirely on state foreclosure law would protect adequately federal interests.”). 
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foreclosure sales based on state law deficiencies in the sale.7 In complying with 
the Supreme Court’s ruling in BFP, Congress should expressly exempt real 
estate foreclosure sales from avoidance powers in the “constructive fraud” 
provision of § 548(a)(1)(B). 
With the current issues in the national housing market and state foreclosure 
processes, the Code should not, and as § 541(c) proves, is not required to, defer 
to state law in determining avoidance powers.8 Section 541(c) allows an 
interest of the debtor to become property of the estate “notwithstanding any 
provision in an agreement, transfer instrument, or applicable nonbankruptcy 
law.”9 Avoidance based on state law compliance should require “substantial 
compliance” rather than complete compliance with state law. 
This Comment argues that having a federal foreclosure standard and 
exempting foreclosure sales from “constructively fraudulent” avoidance would 
resolve the inconsistencies with state law requirements. This solution aligns the 
bankruptcy trustee’s avoidance powers with the intent of Congress, the purpose 
of the Code, and current case law. Homeowners have state law remedies under 
wrongful foreclosure statutes to protect their interests.10 Therefore, 
mortgagees, as secured creditors, should not be subjected to additional hurdles 
to secure their collateral under the avoidance powers if the sale is absent actual 
fraud, as stated in § 548(a)(1)(A), or is otherwise noncollusive. 
The beginning of this Comment will map out the current avoidance powers 
under the Code and the rise of the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act 
(“UFCA”) and Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (“UFTA”). It will then 
discuss the split of authority in determining the meaning of the reasonably 
equivalent value requirement of § 548(a) before and after the Supreme Court’s 
decision in BFP. 
Part II.A of this Comment will propose needed amendments to the Code, 
including the need for a state law substantial-compliance standard in 
accordance with the decision in BFP and current case law. Part II.B discusses 
state inconsistencies and the need for a federal standard. First, it will show that 
these amendments will prevent avoidance based on the numerous inconsistent 
 
 7 511 U.S. at 542. 
 8 In protecting the interests of the bankruptcy estate, § 541(c) allows for the invalidation of 
nonbankruptcy law or state law for the purpose of bringing property into the estate. 11 U.S.C. § 541(c). 
 9 Id. § 541(c)(1).  
 10 See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 726 (2014); GA. CODE ANN. § 44-14-162.2 (2014); MICH. COMP. 
LAWS § 600.3204 (2014); WASH. REV. CODE § 61.24.040 (2014). 
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state laws governing foreclosure sales, including the jurisdictional splits in 
determining the validity of the Mortgage Electronic Registration System and 
proof of chain of assignments, while maintaining the freedom to avoid 
foreclosure sales shown to be collusive. Second, it will address the difficulty of 
determining what minimum bid is sufficient to “shock the judicial conscience” 
as stated in BFP11 so as to avoid a foreclosure sale on that basis. Third, it will 
then layout recent decisions pertaining to state law foreclosure notice and 
advertisement requirements. Fourth, it will highlight the need to shift to a 
substantial-compliance safe harbor for avoidance powers in regard to 
foreclosure sales. Finally, Part II.C of this Comment will address collusive 
sales and the reasons why foreclosure sales should still be subject to avoidance 
when actual fraud, or collusion, is present as opposed to constructive fraud. 
I. BACKGROUND 
Upon filing a bankruptcy petition, a bankruptcy estate is created pursuant to 
§ 541 consisting of “all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property.”12 
Property that has been subject to a prepetition foreclosure sale is not property 
of the estate because the debtor no longer has a legal or equitable interest in the 
property after the sale, and thus no interest at the time of the filing of the 
petition.13 Sections 544 through 549 of the Code allow a trustee to avoid these 
prepetition and postpetition transfers under various circumstances, including 
actual fraud, constructive fraud, or a lack of state law compliance.14 
Drafters of the UFTA, the successor to the UFCA, conformed the UFTA to 
the language in § 548 of the Code.15 Section 548(a)(1)(A) maps out the 
avoidance powers based on actual fraud, while § 548(a)(1)(B) allows for 
avoidance of a sale in which the debtor fails to receive reasonably equivalent 
value for the property or one that is constructively fraudulent.16 
 
 11 511 U.S. at 542.  
 12 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1).  
 13 See id.  
 14 Id. §§ 544–549; see BFP, 511 U.S. at 545–46.  
 15 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 548.01[1][b] (Alan N. Resnick & Harry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed. 2010); 
see Asarco LLC v. Ams. Mining Corp., 396 B.R. 278, 336 (S.D. Tex. 2008) (“The UFTA replaced the term 
‘fair consideration’ with ‘reasonably equivalent value.’”); Elaine A. Welle, Is It Time for Wyoming to Update 
Its Fraudulent Conveyance Laws?, 5 WYO. L. REV. 207, 215 (2005); see infra Part I.B (discussing the drafting 
of the UFCA and UFTA to promote uniformity among state fraudulent transfer laws). In 2014, the UFTA was 
amended and its name was changed to the Uniform Voidable Transactions Act (“UVTA”). This Comment 
refers to the UFTA because the changes were nominal and the new name has not been adopted by a significant 
number of states. See UNIF. VOIDABLE TRANSACTIONS ACT (2014). 
 16 11 U.S.C. § 548(a). 
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Since the Code does not define reasonably equivalent value,17 courts have 
used different tests in determining reasonably equivalent value, especially for a 
forced sale such as a foreclosure sale. These standards have varied drastically 
throughout the circuits. The Fifth Circuit used a percentage approach,18 while 
the Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (“BAP”) allowed a rebuttable 
presumption of sufficient price in a foreclosure sale.19 The Seventh Circuit 
added a third approach and looked to the totality of the circumstances in 
determining reasonably equivalent value.20 Finally, in 1994, the Supreme 
Court addressed the issue of reasonably equivalent value. 
In BFP, the Court held that consideration received at a noncollusive 
foreclosure sale within one year prepetition satisfies the reasonably equivalent 
value requirement of § 548.21 The Court intended to close the door on the 
reasonably-equivalent-value debate, but it expressly left open the option of 
avoidance based on lack of state law compliance,22 thus leaving the door open 
for more costly and unnecessary litigation. 
A. Avoidance Powers Under the Code 
Under § 541, a debtor’s assets, which include “all legal or equitable 
interests,” are placed into the bankruptcy estate upon the filing of a bankruptcy 
petition.23 Occasionally, if a debtor has defaulted on his home loan, the lender 
would have already foreclosed on the debtor’s property before the debtor files 
a bankruptcy petition. Under the avoidance powers in the Code, a trustee may 
set aside a prepetition foreclosure sale and bring the foreclosed property, or the 
value of it, back into the estate for distribution to creditors.24 
 
 17 The only term from the phrase “reasonably equivalent value” defined in the Code is “value,” defined 
as “property, or satisfaction or securing of a present or antecedent debt of the debtor.” Id. § 548(d)(2)(A). 
Although the language of the UFTA originated from § 548, there remained differences, the main one being 
that the UFTA contained an absolute defense for enforcement of a security interest in compliance with Article 
9 of the Uniform Commercial Code. 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 15, at ¶ 548.01[2]. 
 18 See, e.g., Durrett v. Wash. Nat’l Ins. Co., 621 F.2d 201, 203–04 (5th Cir. 1980). 
 19 See, e.g., Lawyers Title Ins. Corp. v. Madrid (In re Madrid), 21 B.R. 424, 428 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1982), 
aff’d on other grounds, 725 F.2d 1197 (9th Cir. 1984). 
 20 See, e.g., Bundles v. Baker (In re Bundles), 856 F.2d 815, 824 (7th Cir. 1988). 
 21 511 U.S. 531, 534 (1993). 
 22 Id. at 545–46. 
 23 11 U.S.C. § 541 (2012).  
 24 Id. §§ 544–49. 
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Sections 544 through 549 of the Code set out the numerous prepetition and 
postpetition avoidance powers of the trustee.25 Section 544 allows a trustee to 
avoid a transfer that could have been avoided under applicable law, including 
state law, by an unsecured creditor or a hypothetical claimant.26 This section of 
the Code is the root of many inconsistencies in the exercise of the avoidance 
powers, and those inconsistencies are exacerbated by the drastic variation 
among state foreclosure and property laws.27 Section 545 of the Code allows a 
trustee to avoid certain statutory liens.28 Section 547 allows avoidance of 
prepetition preferential transfers.29 Section 548 sets out the fraudulent transfer 
avoidance powers.30 Finally, § 549 covers the avoidance of postpetition 
transfers authorized under § 303(f) or § 542(c).31 
The purpose of these avoidance powers is to preserve all potential assets of 
the bankruptcy estate, including property of the debtor that has recently been 
the subject of a foreclosure sale, and to ensure fair distribution among all the 
creditors.32 Courts have long considered foreclosure sales transfers under the 
Code, and, as such, they are susceptible to the avoidance powers of a trustee.33 
Mortgage lenders are especially at risk of avoidance under § 548 of the 
Code, which contains both actual and constructive fraud provisions. Section 
548(a)(1) permits a trustee to avoid any transfer of a debtor’s property, or any 
obligation incurred by the debtor: 
[T]hat was made or incurred on or within two years before the date of 
the filing of the petition, if the debtor voluntarily or involuntarily— 
 
 25 Id. 
 26 Id. § 544. 
 27 See infra Part II.B. 
 28 11 U.S.C. § 545. 
 29 Id. § 547. 
 30 Id. § 548. 
 31 Id. Section 303(f) allows the debtor to continue to use, acquire, or dispose of property in an 
involuntary bankruptcy case. Id. § 303(f). Section 542(c) governs good faith transfers of property of the debtor 
by an entity that had neither actual notice nor actual knowledge of the commencement of the case. Id. § 542(c). 
 32 See, e.g., Bundles v. Baker (In re Bundles), 856 F.2d 815, 824 (7th Cir. 1988); Martin v. Phillips (In re 
Butcher), 58 B.R. 128, 130 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1986), aff’d 829 F.2d 596 (6th Cir. 1987); Richardson v. 
Gillman (In re Richardson), 23 B.R. 434, 447 (Bankr. D. Utah 1982).  
 33 Christian v. Ryan (In re Christian), 48 B.R. 833, 834 (D. Colo. 1985) (“11 U.S.C. §101(48) [currently 
§ 101(54)] defines ‘transfer’ as ‘every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or 
involuntary, of disposing of or parting with property or with an interest in property, including retention of title 
as a security interest and foreclosure of the debtor’s equity of redemption.’”). 
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(A) made such transfer or incurred such obligation with the actual 
intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any entity to which the debtor was 
or became . . . indebted . . . .34 
Under § 548(a)(1)(B), a trustee may also avoid a transfer on the grounds of 
constructive fraud if the transfer occurred within two years prepetition.35 
Constructive fraud is deemed to have occurred when the debtor has: 
[R]eceived less than a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for 
such transfer or obligation; and  
(ii)(I) was insolvent on the date that such transfer was made . . . or 
became insolvent as a result of such transfer . . . ;  
(II) was engaged in business or a transaction . . . for which any 
property remaining with the debtor was an unreasonably small 
capital;  
(III) intended to incur . . . debts that would be beyond the debtor’s 
ability to pay as such debts matured; or  
(IV) made such transfer to or for the benefit of an insider . . . .36 
After a trustee successfully avoids a transfer, § 550 comes into effect. 
Section 550 allows the trustee to recover the transferred property or the value 
of the transferred property and bring it back into the estate for distribution.37 
This section would essentially permit the voiding of a prepetition foreclosure 
sale and require the value of the collateral, or the foreclosed residence, to be 
restored to the estate for distribution among all creditors of the debtor, not just 
the lender who originally had the secured loan and rights to the collateral. 
B. Avoidance Powers Pre-1938: UFCA and UFTA 
In an effort to promote uniformity among state fraudulent transfer laws, in 
1918, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 
drafted the UFCA.38 Unfortunately, only twenty-six states adopted the UFCA, 
defeating the intended uniformity among the states.39 
 
 34 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1). 
 35 Id. § 548(a)(1)(B). 
 36 Id. 
 37 Id. § 550. Section 550 states: “[T]o the extent that a transfer is avoided under section 544, 545, 547, 
548, 549, 553(b), or 724(a) . . . the trustee may recover, for the benefit of the estate, the property transferred, 
or, if the court so orders, the value of such property . . . .” Id. 
 38 Welle, supra note 15, at 212. 
 39 Id. 
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Originally, federal bankruptcy law addressed only transfers accompanied 
by actual fraud.40 Then, in 1938, amendments to the law introduced the 
concept of avoiding constructively fraudulent transfers.41 Because these 
amendments were not intended to preempt state law, a bankruptcy trustee 
continued to have the option of avoiding a transfer under either federal 
bankruptcy law or nonbankruptcy state law.42 
Because of the numerous conflicts that continued to arise between federal 
and state transfer law, and the large number of states that did not adopt the 
UFCA, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 
promulgated the UFTA to replace the UFCA in 1984.43 Today, almost all 
states have adopted the UFTA or a similar version.44 Similar to § 548 of the 
Code, the UFTA allows for avoidance of prepetition transfers; however, it 
extends the statute of limitations to four years, provides a creditor-friendly 
insolvency definition, and also expands remedies and defenses.45 The most 
important defense for mortgage lenders against a fraudulent transfer claim 
under the UFTA is the absolute defense for transfers that “result[] from . . . 
enforcement of a security interest in compliance with Article 9 of the Uniform 
Commercial Code,” such as a foreclosure.46 
Additionally, in determining whether there is a constructively fraudulent 
transfer, the UFTA examines different “badges of fraud.”47 Those badges 
include whether: 
(1) the transfer or obligation was to an insider; 
 
 40 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 15, at ¶ 548.01[2] (“Before the Chandler Act, federal 
bankruptcy law only directly addressed actual intent fraudulent transfers, and then only to the extent made 
within four months of bankruptcy.”). 
 41 Id. 
 42 See 11 U.S.C. § 544(b); 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 15, at ¶ 548.01[2]. 
 43 Welle, supra note 15, at 215; see Asarco LLC v. Ams. Mining Corp., 396 B.R. 278, 336 (S.D. Tex. 
2008) (“The UFTA replaced the term ‘fair consideration’ with ‘reasonably equivalent value.’”). 
 44 As of early 2015, the states that have adopted the UFTA include: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, 
California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, the District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, 
Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, 
Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, 
Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, U.S. Virgin Islands, Utah, 
Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. Legislative Fact Sheet, UNIFORM LAW 
COMMISSION, http://www.uniformlawcommission.com/LegislativeFactSheet.aspx?title=Fraudulent%20 
Transfer%20Act%20-%20now%20known%20as%20Voidable%20Transactions%20Act (last visited Jan. 3, 
2015); see also 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 15, at ¶ 548.01B.  
 45 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 15, at ¶ 548.01[2][a][i].  
 46 Id. (quoting UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 8(e)(2) (1984)).  
 47 Wolkowitz v. Beverly (In re Beverly), 374 B.R. 221, 235–36 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2007). 
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(2) the debtor retained possession or control of the property 
transferred after the transfer; 
(3) the transfer or obligation was disclosed or concealed; 
(4) before the transfer was made or obligation was incurred, the 
debtor had been sued or threatened with suit; 
(5) the transfer was of substantially all the debtor’s assets; 
(6) the debtor absconded; 
(7) the debtor removed or concealed assets; 
(8) the value of the consideration received by the debtor was 
reasonably equivalent to the value of the asset transferred or the 
amount of the obligation incurred; 
(9) the debtor was insolvent or became insolvent shortly after the 
transfer was made or the obligation was incurred; 
(10) the transfer occurred shortly before or shortly after a substantial 
debt was incurred; and 
(11) the debtor transferred the essential assets of the business to a 
lienholder who transferred the assets to an insider of the 
debtor.48 
Section 548 differs from these UFTA badges of fraud in that the only badges 
of fraud listed in § 548 are that the transfer was made to an insider, the 
consideration was a reasonably equivalent value of the asset, and the debtor 
was insolvent.49 
Finally, the UFTA carved out a safe harbor for foreclosure sales, defining 
reasonably equivalent value as the price paid at a noncollusive, regularly 
conducted foreclosure sale.50 In its 1984 amendments to the Code, Congress 
did not include a definition for reasonably equivalent value and did not include 
a safe harbor for foreclosure sales like that in UFTA.51 
 
 48 UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 4(b) (1984); see Beverly, 374 B.R. at 234–35 n.16 (quoting CAL. 
CIV. CODE § 3439.04(b)). 
 49 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(B) (2012). 
 50 UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 3(b) (1984) (“[A] person gives a reasonably equivalent value if 
the person acquires an interest of the debtor in an asset pursuant to a regularly conducted, noncollusive 
foreclosure sale or execution of a power of sale . . . under a mortgage, deed of trust, or security agreement.”). 
 51 Marie T. Reilly, A Search for Reason in “Reasonably Equivalent Value” After BFP v. Resolution 
Trust Corp., 13 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 261, 266–68 (2005).  
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C. Reasonably Equivalent Value Pre-BFP 
Congress’s failure to define reasonably equivalent value in § 548 created 
much debate among jurisdictions in interpreting what constitutes reasonably 
equivalent value for forced sales, such as residential foreclosure sales.52 Before 
the Supreme Court’s lender-friendly decision in BFP,53 courts differed when 
defining reasonably equivalent value for a foreclosure sale, with some courts 
comparing reasonably equivalent value to fair market value, while other courts 
refused to equate the two.54 
1. Durrett v. Washington National Insurance Co. 
In 1980, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals established the Durrett “seventy 
percent rule.”55 In Durrett v. Washington National Insurance Co., the district 
court held that $115,400 was a “fair” price for a home with a market value of 
over $200,000.56 The district court analyzed the facts of the case under § 67(d) 
of the former Bankruptcy Act,57 which required “fair consideration” rather than 
reasonably equivalent value.58 On appeal, in analyzing the fairness of the 
foreclosure sale price, the Fifth Circuit looked to the Tenth Circuit Court of 
Appeals’s decision in Schafer v. Hammond,59 which held that a price of fifty 
percent of the market value was void for lack of consideration.60 
 
 52 The only term from the phrase “reasonably equivalent value” defined in the Code is “value,” defined 
as “property, or satisfaction or securing of a present or antecedent debt of the debtor.” 11 U.S.C. 
§ 548(d)(2)(A). Although the text of the UFTA was taken from § 548, differences remain, the main one being 
UFTA contained an absolute defense for enforcement of a security interest in compliance with Article 9 of the 
Uniform Commercial Code. 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 15, at ¶ 548.01[2][a][i]. 
 53 511 U.S. 531, 543 (1993).  
 54 Compare Durrett v. Wash. Nat’l Ins. Co., 621 F.2d 201, 202 (5th Cir. 1980) (looking to a percentage 
of fair market value to establish reasonably equivalent value), with Lawyers Title Ins. Corp. v. Madrid (In re 
Madrid), 21 B.R. 424, 425 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1982) (presuming consideration received at a noncollusive and 
regularly conducted foreclosure sale to be reasonably equivalent value), aff’d on other grounds, 725 F.2d 1197 
(9th Cir. 1984), and Bundles v. Baker (In re Bundles), 856 F.2d 815, 823 (7th Cir. 1988) (looking to the 
totality of the circumstances to determine reasonably equivalent value). 
 55 621 F.2d at 203. 
 56 Id. at 202. 
 57 See generally Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (repealed 1978), amended by Chandler 
Act, Pub. L. No. 75-696, 52 Stat. 840 (1938). 
 58 See Durrett, 621 F.2d at 201 n.2 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 107(d)(1)–(2), (6) (1976) (repealed 1978)); see 
also 4 Madrid, 21 B.R. at 426 (“Fair consideration [under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898] was defined as a ‘fair 
equivalent’ in a good faith exchange.”); COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 67.33, at 505–06 (Lawrence P. King, ed., 
14th ed. 1975) (defining “fair consideration” as a fair equivalent or not too small in value compared to the 
value of the transferred property).  
 59 Schafer v. Hammond, 456 F.2d 15, 16 (10th Cir. 1972). 
 60 Durrett, 621 F.2d at 203 (citing Schafer, 456 F.2d at 16).  
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The Fifth Circuit held that the sale price in Durrett, valued at fifty-seven 
percent of market value, was not a fair equivalent value for the transfer of the 
property.61 The court went on to explain that it could not find a single case in 
which a court approved a transfer of less than seventy percent of market 
value.62 Although the Durrett seventy percent rule was merely dicta,63 courts 
began to automatically invalidate any foreclosure sale that brought less than 
seventy percent of fair market value.64 
2. In re Madrid 
Four years later, the Ninth Circuit BAP expressly rejected the Durrett 
seventy percent rule and established an alternative rule, allowing a 
presumption of sufficient price in a foreclosure sale.65 The effect of the BAP’s 
rule was to make reasonably equivalent value more lender-friendly.66 In 
Lawyers Title Insurance Corp. v. Madrid (In re Madrid), the defendant 
appealed the lower court’s ruling to rescind the foreclosure sale as a fraudulent 
transfer.67 The foreclosure sale brought between sixty-four and sixty-seven 
percent of the market value of the property,68 which was less than the seventy 
percent required by the Durrett court. After filing for chapter 11, the debtor 
and the trustee brought an action to set aside the foreclosure sale as a 
 
 61 Id.  
 62 The court stated: “We have been unable to locate a decision of any district or appellate court dealing 
only with a transfer of real property as the subject of attack under section 67(d) of the Act, which has approved 
the transfer for less than 70 percent of the market value of the property.” Id. 
 63 The court later clarified the Durrett seventy percent rule was only dicta, stating “Interestingly, 
bankruptcy courts frequently cite Durrett for the ‘70% test’ based on its dicta. But on the facts actually before 
the Durrett court, it held only that 57.7% of market value does not constitute reasonably equivalent value.” 
FDIC v. Blanton, 918 F.2d 524, 531 n.7 (5th Cir. 1990) (citations omitted).  
 64 See Fed. Nat’l Mortgage Ass’n v. Wheeler (In re Wheeler), 34 B.R. 818, 820–21 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 
1983); Wickham v. United No. Am. Bank (In re Thompson), 18 B.R. 67, 69 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1982); see 
also Cooper v. Smith (In re Smith), 24 B.R. 19, 23 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 1982) (deciding that the percentage of 
the amount paid is only one factor in determining reasonably equivalent value). 
 65 Lawyers Title Ins. Corp. v. Madrid (In re Madrid), 21 B.R. 424, 426–27 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1984) (“We 
decline to follow Durrett’s 70% fair market value rule for the reason that a regularly conducted sale, open to 
all bidders and all creditors, is itself a safeguard against the evils of private transfers to relatives and 
favorites.”), aff’d on other grounds, 725 F.2d 1197 (9th Cir. 1984), cited with approval in BFP v. Imperial 
Sav. & Loan Ass’n (In re BFP), 974 F.2d 1144, 1148 (9th Cir. 1992), aff’d sub nom. BFP v. Resolution Trust 
Corp., 511 U.S. 531 (1994). 
 66 Madrid, 21 B.R. at 426–27. 
 67 Id. at 425. 
 68 Id. 
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fraudulent conveyance.69 The lower court agreed, rescinded the sale, and 
awarded attorney’s fees.70 
On appeal, the BAP recognized the general rule that inadequacy of price 
was insufficient on its own to avoid a foreclosure sale.71 It followed the 
Nevada rule requiring additional “proof of some element of fraud, unfairness, 
or oppression” that accounts for the inadequate sale price.72 The court rejected 
the Durrett seventy-percent-rule reasoning, stating that an arbitrary threshold 
of seventy percent was not required and was counterproductive, since a 
regularly conducted foreclosure sale, by itself, “safeguards against the evils” of 
fraudulent transfers.73 The court justified its ruling based on the policy that 
“the law of foreclosure should be harmonized with the law of fraudulent 
conveyances,” and it held that the consideration received at a noncollusive and 
regularly conducted foreclosure sale is presumed to be reasonably equivalent 
value under § 548 of the Code.74 
The dissent warned that the only way to question a fraudulent transfer is to 
examine the adequacy of the foreclosure price.75 Allowing an irrebuttable 
presumption of reasonableness of consideration leaves no test for adequacy of 
price.76 Because reasonably equivalent value is a federal standard, to allow an 
irrebuttable presumption would burden the federal court’s flexibility to 
determine an important factual issue under its jurisdiction.77 
3. In re Bundles 
In 1988, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals took a third, and the most 
flexible, approach in defining reasonably equivalent value.78 In In re Bundles, 
the foreclosure sale of a debtor’s property, worth $15,500, resulted in a $5,000 
 
 69 Id. 
 70 Id. 
 71 Id. at 427 (“If we consider the question of price adequacy in the context of foreclosure law we find, not 
surprisingly, that mere inadequacy will not upset a foreclosure sale.” (citing Golden v. Tomiyasi, 387 P.2d 989 
(Nev. 1963))). 
 72 Oller v. Sonoma Cnty. Land Title Co., 290 P.2d 880 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1955), quoted in Madrid, 21 
B.R. at 427. 
 73 Madrid, 21 B.R. at 426–27. The Madrid court stated a regularly conducted foreclosure sale, by itself, 
“safeguards against the evils of private transfers to relatives and favorites.” Id. The court was concerned about 
fraudulent transfers by a debtor or transfers present actual fraud. Id. 
 74 Id. at 427. 
 75 Id. at 428 (Volinn, J., dissenting). 
 76 Id.  
 77 Id.  
 78 Bundles v. Baker (In re Bundles), 856 F.2d 815 (7th Cir. 1988).  
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foreclosure sale price.79 Rejecting both the Durrett seventy percent rule and the 
Madrid presumption, the court looked to find a middle ground.80 It held that all 
facts and circumstances must be considered when deciding whether a sale 
obtained reasonably equivalent value81 and recognized a rebuttable 
presumption in favor of a purchaser at a “regularly conducted, non-collusive 
foreclosure sale.”82 Under this approach, the list of factors a court must 
consider includes, but is not limited to: (1) whether there was a fair appraisal of 
the property; (2) whether the property was widely advertised; and (3) whether 
competitive bidding was encouraged.83 
The court expressly rejected “the view that state law, either directly or as 
the federal rule of decision, should determine the outcome of a bankrupt’s 
complaint . . . .”84 It also examined the underlying policy reasons for 
foreclosure sale avoidance and the language of § 548(a)(2)(A).85 The court 
emphasized that § 548(a)(2)(A) “makes no distinction between sales that do 
and do not comply with state law.”86 
Section 548(a) establishes a standard for avoiding a foreclosure sale 
independent from state law.87 The court reasoned that Congress’s intentional 
use of a federal standard made clear that it did not consider reliance on state 
foreclosure law to avoid a transfer to be sufficient to protect federal interests.88 
The standard established by Bundles required bankruptcy courts to consider the 
transaction in its totality and not just its compliance under state law.89 
 
 79 Id. at 817.  
 80 Id. at 824 (citing General Indus., Inc. v. Shea (In re General Indus., Inc.), 79 B.R. 124 (Bankr. D. 
Mass. 1987); Adwar v. Capgro Leasing Corp. (In re Adwar), 55 B.R. 111 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1985); Ruebeck v. 
Attleboro Sav. Bank (In re Ruebeck), 55 B.R. 163 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1985); First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. 
Hulm (In re Hulm), 45 B.R. 523 (Bankr. D.N.D 1984)).  
 81 Bundles at 824. The factors included in this consideration should be fairness of appraisal price, 
advertisement, and the availability of competitive bidding. Id. 
 82 Id. at 823–24. 
 83 Id at 824.  
 84 Id. at 822.  
 85 Id. at 822–23. The court stated its central policy concern was the fear of a “negative effect on the 
foreclosure market.” Id. at 822 n.12; see Abramson v. Lakewood Bank & Trust Co., 647 F.2d 547 (5th Cir. 
1981) (Clark, J., dissenting) (stating that the seventy percent rule “would cast a cloud upon mortgages and trust 
deeds naturally inhibiting a purchaser . . . from buying at foreclosure . . . press[ing] further the prices of 
foreclosure sales”). 
 86 Bundles, 856 F.2d at 821.  
 87 See 11 U.S.C. § 548 (2012); Bundles, 856 F.2d at 824. 
 88 Bundles, 856 F.2d at 824. 
 89 Id. Although the court acknowledged bankruptcy courts should give respect to state law, whether the 
sale complied with state law “cannot be considered conclusive with respect to the issue of federal law before 
the bankruptcy court.” Id. at 825.  
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In summary, before 1993, there was a split among the three approaches in 
deciding whether to avoid a transfer based on a lack of reasonably equivalent 
value paid at a foreclosure sale. The Fifth, Sixth, and Tenth Circuits followed 
the Durrett seventy percent rule, while the Ninth Circuit followed the Madrid 
approach determining any price paid at a noncollusive foreclosure sale was a 
reasonable equivalent.90 The Seventh Circuit maintained the third approach 
established in Bundles, looking to the sale in its totality and assessing different 
factors in addition to state law compliance, including appraisal price, 
advertisement, and the availability of competitive bidding. The time had come 
for the Supreme Court to resolve this circuit split. 
D. Reasonably Equivalent Value Post-BFP 
In 1993, the Supreme Court finally stepped into the reasonably-equivalent-
value discussion to resolve the circuit split. The Supreme Court granted 
certiorari in BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp. to define reasonably equivalent 
value for purposes of residential foreclosure sales.91 In BFP, the respondent 
purchased the petitioner’s beachfront home, valued at $725,000, at a 
foreclosure sale for $433,000.92 The petitioner later filed bankruptcy and 
sought to have the sale set aside on the grounds that the sale was a fraudulent 
transfer under § 548(a).93 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit, agreeing with the 
decision in Madrid, adopted the presumption that consideration received at a 
noncollusive, regularly conducted real estate foreclosure sale constitutes 
reasonably equivalent value under § 548(a) so long as it complies with 
applicable California property and foreclosure law.94 
In its attempt at reestablishing what it incorrectly described as “a peaceful 
coexistence” of fraudulent transfer law and foreclosure law enjoyed pre-
Durrett, the Supreme Court first looked to the text of the Code to define 
 
 90 BFP v. Imperial Sav. & Loan Ass’n (In re BFP), 974 F.2d 1144, 1148 (9th Cir. 1992) (affirming the 
reasoning in Madrid), aff’d sub nom. BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531 (1994).  
 91 511 U.S. at 536. Courts have extended the BFP ruling to tax sales. Compare Kojima v. Grandote Int’l 
Liab. Co. (In re Grandote Country Club Co., Ltd.), 252 F.3d 1146, 1152 (10th Cir. 2001), and Fisher v. Moon 
(In re Fisher), 355 B.R. 20, 22–23 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2006), with Sherman v. Rose (In re Sherman), 223 
B.R. 555 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 1998), and Wentworth v. Town of Acton, Me. (In re Wentworth), 221 B.R. 316, 
319–20 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1998). Courts have also extended the BFP ruling to execution sales. E.g., O’Neill v. 
Dell (In re O’Neill), 204 B.R. 881, 886–87 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1997).  
 92 511 U.S. at 534.  
 93 Id. 
 94 Id.; see Asarco LLC v. Ams. Mining Corp., 396 B.R. 278, 337 (S.D. Tex. 2008) (explaining that, 
outside of the foreclosure context, “[reasonably equivalent value] will continue to have an independent 
meaning (ordinarily a meaning similar to fair market value).” (quoting BFP, 511 U.S. at 545)). 
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reasonably equivalent value.95 The Court noted that both Durrett and Bundles 
referred to fair market value.96 Because Congress used the phrase “fair market 
value” in other places in the Code, specifically in § 522(a)(2), it could have 
also used the phrase in § 548(a) if it felt fair market value was the appropriate 
benchmark for measurement of the consideration in a transfer.97 Instead, 
Congress specifically used the phrase reasonably equivalent value.98 It is a 
long-standing cannon of interpretation that Congress acts intentionally and 
purposefully in its choice of statutory language, especially when using 
language in one section and omitting it from another.99 For this reason, five 
justices100 agreed that consideration received at a noncollusive foreclosure sale 
satisfies the requirement of § 548(a).101 
The dissent102 warned that Congress never intended reasonably equivalent 
value to allow a “peppercorn” price to be sufficient for a “California 
beachfront estate.”103 The dissent disagreed with the majority’s rationalization 
that forced-sale prices are the “very antithesis” of fair market value and 
foreclosed homes are worth “whatever price was paid.”104 The majority refuted 
the dissent’s objection to treating foreclosure transfers differently from all 
other transfers.105 However, the majority was not persuaded by the dissent’s 
argument that the property is “subject to forced sale,” which affects the 
property’s alienability and worth, and, therefore, should be treated as such.106 
The Court also stated that the sale could be set aside under state foreclosure 
law if the price was so low as to “shock the conscience or raise a presumption 
of fraud or unfairness.”107 This contradicted the Court’s earlier statement in 
 
 95 BFP, 511 U.S. at 537. 
 96 Id. at 536–37. 
 97 Id. at 537. 
 98 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(B)(i) (2012). 
 99 See Chicago v. Envtl. Def. Fund, 511 U.S. 328, 338 (1994), cited by BFP, 511 U.S. at 537.  
 100 Justice Scalia delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Rehnquist, and 
Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, and Thomas, joined. BFP, 511 U.S. 531. 
 101 Id. at 534. 
 102 Justice Souter wrote the dissenting opinion, in which he was joined by Justices Blackmun, Stevens, 
and Ginsburg. Id. at 549 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 103 Id.  
 104 Id. at 550–51.  
 105 Id. at 548 (majority opinion). 
 106 Id. at 548. 
 107 Id. at 542. The Court held this standard to be satisfied when: 
Any irregularity in the conduct of the sale that would permit judicial invalidation of the sale 
under applicable state law deprives the sale price of its conclusive force . . . and the transfer may 
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which it disagreed with Durrett on the basis that no other court had ever 
applied the “grossly inadequate price” badge of fraud under fraudulent transfer 
law.108 This contradiction, as seen in Part II.B.2 of this Comment, has left 
courts scrambling to define what shocks the judicial conscience in an ever-
changing housing market.109 
Justice Souter introduced a third possibility, ignored by the majority, when 
choosing between avoiding the transfer whenever fair market value was not 
paid and avoiding the transfer based on collusiveness or improper 
procedures.110 This third option looked to the plain meaning of reasonably 
equivalent value and allowed bankruptcy courts to decide whether reasonably 
equivalent value had been received on a case-by-case basis.111 Again, each 
option presented by the Supreme Court still left prepetition foreclosure sales 
open to the possibility of being avoided absent actual fraud on the basis of a 
lack of compliance with the numerous and inconsistent state laws governing 
foreclosure sales.112 
The Supreme Court, in its BFP decision, wanted to protect mortgagees in 
their power to foreclose on their collateral by taking away one major avenue 
for a trustee to avoid the foreclosure sale. Unfortunately, this decision also left 
foreclosure sales “unsecured” because of the high probability of being avoided 
by the many inconsistent, and sometimes incorrect, interpretations of state 
property, contract, and fraudulent transfer laws. Under the Code, an unsecured 
creditor is not entitled to full payment of its claim, is not afforded priority in 
payment, and typically receives a pro rata payment, if any payment at all, 
during distribution.113 The court’s interpretation of reasonably equivalent value 
should not leave mortgagees, as secured creditors, in a similar position to 
unsecured creditors. These inconsistencies and avoidance powers based on 
state law compliance stand “as an obstacle to the accomplishment and 
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.”114 The objectives 
of the most recent Code amendments include limiting debtor abuse of the 
 
be avoided if the price received was not reasonably equivalent to the property’s actual value at 
the time of the sale. 
Id. at 545–46. 
 108 Id. at 542–43.  
 109 See infra Part II.B.2.  
 110 BFP, 511 U.S. at 551–52 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 111 Id. at 560–62.  
 112 Id. at 545–46. 
 113 11 U.S.C. §§ 506, 507, 726, 1122, 1143, 1326 (2012). 
 114 See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941). 
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bankruptcy system,115 remedying unfairness to creditors, and “equitable 
distribution” of a debtor’s assets.116 The limitations placed on unsecured 
creditors in the Code are proof that Congress paid respect to secured creditors, 
including those who took measures to secure their collateral prepetition and at 
the outset of the lending process. 
While the decision in BFP was intended to clarify the law, it left open the 
significant possibility of prepetition foreclosures being avoided as fraudulent 
transfers absent actual fraud. Avoidance of a foreclosure sale is still allowed if 
the sale was “collusive” or not in compliance with applicable state law.117 This 
complete compliance requirement for state law directly defeats the policy of 
harmonizing bankruptcy law with state law, which was highlighted by the 
majority in BFP.118 Contrary to the majority’s reasoning in BFP, the “peaceful 
co-existence”119 of bankruptcy law and state foreclosure law never existed, and 
it does not exist today, even with BFP’s lender-friendly interpretation of 
reasonably equivalent value. Inconsistent and incorrect state laws governing 
foreclosure sales subject lenders to even more hurdles in securing their 
collateral than other creditors to whom Congress has not similarly showed 
intent on preferential treatment. 
II. ANALYSIS 
Amending the Code would alleviate the discrepancies and flaws of the 
trustee’s avoidance powers based on state law compliance. The Supreme 
Court’s decision in BFP removed the possibility of avoidance of foreclosure 
sales based on constructive fraud, or reasonably equivalent value, but left open 
avoidance actions based on lack of state law compliance. Requiring only 
substantial compliance with state law would rightfully allow bankruptcy courts 
to decide the cases under their jurisdiction, as emphasized by the dissenting 
opinion in Madrid,120 and would grant lenders the right to secure their 
 
 115 McLaughlin, supra note 2, at 378. 
 116 In re Winshall Settlor’s Trust, 758 F.2d 1136, 1139 n.4 (6th Cir. 1985); 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, 
supra note 15, at ¶ 1100.01 (2009). 
 117 11 U.S.C. §§ 544, 548; BFP, 511 U.S. 531. 
 118 511 U.S. at 542.  
 119 Id. 
 120 Lawyers Title Ins. Corp. v. Madrid (In re Madrid), 21 B.R. 424, 428 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1982) (Volinn, J., 
dissenting) (“In any event, I believe that the concept of ‘reasonably equivalent value’ as a test set for 11 U.S.C. 
§ 548(a)(2) requires that the trial court examine the consideration received in such a sale in the factual context 
of a particular case.”), aff’d on other grounds, 725 F.2d 1197 (9th Cir. 1984). 
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collateral while still providing deference to state law. This change would 
harmonize federal bankruptcy law with state foreclosure law. 
A. Proposed Amendments 
To comply with the Supreme Court ruling in BFP and the intent of 
Congress, as well as achieve the desired “harmony”121 between federal 
bankruptcy law and state foreclosure law, the Code should be amended. The 
proposed amendments would apply only to real estate foreclosure sales. These 
proposed amendments could be added to different sections of the Code, the 
most appropriate one being § 546, titled “Limitations on Avoiding Powers.” 
Section 546 could be amended by adding a new subsection, which would read 
as follows: 
Except as provided in section 548(a)(1)(A), a trustee shall not avoid a 
real estate foreclosure sale unless the trustee can prove a lack of 
substantial compliance with applicable nonbankruptcy law. 
Another possible method of achieving the same result would be to amend 
§ 544, which allows the trustee to avoid transfers that could have been avoided 
under state law or other applicable law. Since § 544(b)(2) expressly limits 
state-law-compliance avoidance powers in regards to charitable contributions, 
the substantial-compliance standard could also be amended as § 544(b)(3) and 
would read as follows: 
Paragraph (1) shall not apply to a real estate foreclosure sale that is in 
substantial compliance with applicable nonbankruptcy law. 
To prevent some litigation over these amendments, both options would also 
benefit from a definition in § 101 of the Code for “substantial compliance.” 
For efficiency and thoroughness, § 101 of the Code should also include a 
definition for “real estate foreclosure sale.” 
In addition to expressly codifying the decision in BFP, § 548(a)(1)(B) 
should be amended to state: 
Consideration received at a noncollusive foreclosure sale constitutes 
“reasonably equivalent value” under § 548(a)(1)(B). 
 
 121 BFP, 511 U.S. at 542–43; see Debra Pogrund Stark, The Emperor Still Has Clothes: Fraudulent 
Conveyance Challenges After the BFP Decision, 47 S.C. L. REV. 563, 572 (1996). 
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Another option for codifying BFP would be to amend § 101 of the Code 
and, looking to the former Bankruptcy Act’s definition of “fair 
consideration,”122 define reasonably equivalent value as follows: 
The term “reasonably equivalent value” means consideration which is 
not too small in value compared to the value of the transferred 
property. In a noncollusive real estate foreclosure sale, reasonably 
equivalent value is the consideration received at the foreclosure sale. 
These proposed amendments would leave open the option for a trustee to 
avoid a real estate foreclosure sale based on either a lack of substantial 
compliance with state law or actual fraud under § 548(a)(1)(A). The proposed 
amendments would fulfill the objectives of Congress123 and the Supreme 
Court. They would balance the interests of states, secured and unsecured 
creditors, and the bankruptcy estate. They would harmonize the policy 
considerations in both BFP124 and Bundles.125 Also, the amendments would 
comply with BFP’s textual arguments pertaining to Congress’s use of 
reasonably equivalent value over fair market value126 and allow for BFP’s 
emphasized deference to state law.127 
Additionally, the proposed amendments acknowledge and remedy the 
argument in Madrid that allowing a fair market value definition is unrealistic 
because foreclosure sales, by their very nature, are riskier and recover less 
consideration than prices at regularly conducted real estate sales.128 Finally, the 
proposed amendments would also recognize Bundles’s rejection of allowing 
“state law . . . [to] determine the outcome of a bankrupt’s complaint” and 
would also have a positive impact on the foreclosure market, relieving it of the 
“cloud . . . naturally inhibit[ing] a purchaser . . . from buying at [a] 
foreclosure.”129 
 
 122 See supra Part I.C.1 for a discussion of fair consideration. 
 123 The objectives of the most recent Code amendments include limiting debtor abuse of the bankruptcy 
system, remedying unfairness to creditors, and equitable distribution of a debtor’s assets. See In re Winshall 
Settlor’s Trust, 758 F.2d 1136, 1139 n.4 (6th Cir. 1985); 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 15, at 
¶ 1100.01. 
 124 511 U.S. 531. 
 125 Bundles v. Baker (In re Bundles), 856 F.2d 815 (7th Cir. 1988).  
 126 BFP, 511 U.S. at 537–38. 
 127 Id. at 546.  
 128 Madrid v. Lawyers Title Ins. Corp. (In re Madrid), 725 F.2d 1197, 1202 (9th Cir. 1984).  
 129 Bundles, 856 F.2d at 822 & n.12 (stating the Durrett seventy percent rule “would cast a cloud upon 
mortgages and trust deeds” and “naturally inhibit a purchaser . . . from buying at foreclosure . . . depress[ing] 
further the prices of foreclosure sales”) (quoting Abramson v. Lakewood Bank & Trust Co., 647 F.2d 547, 550 
(5th Cir. 1981) (Clark, J., dissenting))). 
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The inconsistencies among states’ property and foreclosure laws, as will be 
mapped out in Part II.B of this Comment, and the effect they have on a 
bankruptcy trustee’s avoidance powers would be resolved by the above-
proposed amendments. An amendment requiring substantial compliance with 
state law would allow for a uniform avoidance power and would reduce costly 
and inefficient litigation. 
B. State Law Inconsistencies and the Need for a Federal Standard and 
Substantial-Compliance Safe Harbor 
The proposed amendments in Part II.A of this Comment reconcile the 
Supreme Court’s decision in BFP with the Code and ameliorate the 
inconsistencies resulting from reliance on state foreclosure law in bankruptcy. 
State foreclosure law and the requirements governing foreclosure sales depend 
on numerous factors—chiefly, whether the state permits non-judicial 
foreclosure. 
In a minority of states, real estate foreclosures may only be conducted by 
initiating judicial proceedings.130 In such a judicial foreclosure state, the court 
governs the foreclosure process from default to final sale. After default, the 
lender seeking foreclosure must file a complaint and prove a valid mortgage 
and a homeowner default; the homeowner has the chance to raise all defenses 
before the court.131 The court then issues, or refuses to issue, a judgment and 
order to proceed with the foreclosure sale.132 After a sale, the court may enter a 
deficiency judgment and often an appeal will commence.133 While the strict 
oversight of foreclosure sales in judicial foreclosure states leaves foreclosure 
 
 130 See Grant S. Nelson & Dale A. Whitman, Reforming Foreclosure: The Uniform Nonjudicial 
Foreclosure Act, 53 DUKE L.J. 1399, 1403 (2004) [hereinafter Nelson & Whitman, Reforming Foreclosure] 
(citing GRANT S. NELSON & DALE A. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW 558 (4th ed. 2001) [hereinafter 
NELSON & WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE]). See generally ANDREA LEE NEGRONI ET AL., RESIDENTIAL 
MORTGAGE LENDING: STATE REGULATION MANUAL—MID-ATLANTIC (Aug. 2014), available at WestlawNext 
Real Property Texts & Treatises (Delaware and Pennsylvania); ANDREA LEE NEGRONI ET AL., RESIDENTIAL 
MORTGAGE LENDING: STATE REGULATION MANUAL—NORTH CENTRAL (Aug. 2014), available at 
WestlawNext Real Property Texts & Treatises (Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, and Wisconsin); ANDREA LEE NEGRONI 
ET AL., RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE LENDING: STATE REGULATION MANUAL—NORTH EASTERN (Aug. 2014), 
available at WestlawNext Real Property Texts & Treatises (Connecticut and Vermont); ANDREA LEE 
NEGRONI ET AL., RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE LENDING: STATE REGULATION MANUAL—SOUTH CENTRAL (Aug. 
2014), available at WestlawNext Real Property Texts & Treatises (Kansas and Louisiana); ANDREA LEE 
NEGRONI ET AL., RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE LENDING: STATE REGULATION MANUAL—SOUTH EASTERN (Aug. 
2014), available at WestlawNext Real Property Texts & Treatises (Florida, Kentucky, and South Carolina). 
 131 Ann M. Saegert, Commercial Lending Issues in the United States, 15 PROB. & PROP. 37, 38 (2001). 
 132 Id. 
 133 See NELSON & WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE, supra note 130, at 559. 
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sales less susceptible to being set aside for failure to comply with applicable 
state law or for fraud, the judicial process can typically take up to three years 
after default before a lender can finally obtain satisfaction of the secured 
debt.134 This gives ample time for a debtor to completely exhaust the asset’s 
value, with no adequate protection payments, as are typically required during a 
bankruptcy case.135 
In a majority of states, a non-judicial option is available to lenders to avoid 
unnecessary expense and time in securing collateral.136 In non-judicial 
foreclosure states, statutes govern the sale, and require specific, and sometimes 
stringent, notice, advertisement, and auctioning procedures, as well as 
threshold time requirements to allow a debtor to attempt to cure the default.137 
While these statutes were put in place to procedurally protect the debtor from 
total loss of equity in the absence of a judicial foreclosure requirement, today, 
the amount of equity in a home subject to foreclosure is typically much less 
than it was a decade or two ago.138 The states with the highest foreclosure rates 
are also the states with the highest number of underwater, or undersecured, 
loans, leaving no reason to statutorily protect a “total loss of equity” because 
the debtor often has little, if any, equity in these homes.139 Congress made its 
intention known with regard to negative-equity homeowners in § 362(d)(2), 
which allows for relief from the automatic stay—to the extent that the debtor 
“does not have equity in such property” and the property is not necessary for 
an effective reorganization—and allows for the requisite adequate protection 
 
 134 Saegert, supra note 131, at 38. 
 135 In Florida, the average foreclosure process from default to sale takes 1,027 days. In the District of 
Columbia., the average process takes 1,053 days and in New York averages 906 days. See Les Christie, 
Foreclosure Free Ride: 3 Years, No Payments, CNNMONEY, (Jan. 1, 2012 4:40 PM), http://money.cnn.com/ 
2011/12/28/real_estate/foreclosure. 
 136 Saegert, supra note 131, at 38. As of the writing of this Comment, Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, 
Arkansas, California, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, 
Nevada, New Hampshire, New York, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Dakota, 
Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming allow for non-judicial 
foreclosure sales. Molly F. Jacobson-Greany, Setting Aside Non-judicial Foreclosure Sales: Extending the 
Rule to Cover Both Intrinsic and Extrinsic Fraud or Unfairness, 23 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 139, 144 (2006). 
 137 See generally Nelson & Whitman, Reforming Foreclosure, supra note 130, at 1399.  
 138 15.2 million mortgages have negative equity as of 2009. Brent T. White, Underwater and Not Walking 
Away: Shame, Fear, and the Social Management of the Housing Crisis, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 971, 973–74 
(2010). 
 139 The worst foreclosure markets include Nevada, with 47% of homeowners having negative equity, 
Florida at 30%, and Arizona at 29%. Id. 
TREVINO GALLEYSPROOFS 2/17/2015  2:40 PM 
196 EMORY BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTS JOURNAL [Vol. 31 
payments necessary to protect diminishing value of collateral during a 
bankruptcy case.140 
While this non-judicial foreclosure process is less time-consuming than 
judicial foreclosure, defaulting homeowners in the non-judicial foreclosure 
states often abuse state law’s procedural requirements to delay the foreclosure 
process.141 Some debtors file frivolous lawsuits or multiple bankruptcy 
petitions, seeking protection under the automatic stay provision in the Code.142 
This defeats the purpose of having an efficient non-judicial foreclosure avenue 
available to lenders who are attempting to secure their collateral upon default. 
The following Part will discuss the numerous state law inconsistencies that 
defaulting homeowners often exploit to shelter themselves from a lender 
foreclosing on their property. Homeowners often attempt to challenge the legal 
authority to foreclose and the failure of the secured party to prove a chain of 
assignments under the many different rulings on the validity of the Mortgage 
Electronic Registration System (“MERS”) and the mortgage securitization 
process.143 State law also varies on what exact foreclosure price “shocks the 
judicial conscience” and is therefore a basis for avoidance. Defaulting 
homeowners often also challenge notice and procedural requirements, although 
lenders may find solace under a substantial-compliance standard, similar to the 
proposed amendment in Part II.A of this Comment. 
 
 140 11 U.S.C. § 362(d) (2012) (“On request of a party in interest and after notice and a hearing, the court 
shall grant relief from the stay provided under subsection (a) of this section, such as by terminating, annulling, 
modifying, or conditioning such stay (1) for cause, including the lack of adequate protection of an interest in 
property of such party in interest; (2) with respect to a stay of an act against property under subsection (a) of 
this section, if (A) the debtor does not have an equity in such property; and (B) such property is not necessary 
to an effective reorganization.”). 
 141 Harry Boul, Repeat Filings under BAPCPA: Stays, Multiple Discharges and Chapter 20, 4 ABI 
CONSUMER BANKR. COMMITTEE NEWSL., no. 6, Dec. 2006, available at https://web.archive.org/web/20141124 
022945/http://www.abiworld.org/committees/newsletters/consumer-bankruptcy/vol4num6/RepeatFilings.html 
(“BAPCPA added provisions designed to deny a stay to persistent filers of bad-faith petitions . . . . [Those 
petitioners seek] merely to delay legitimate collection procedures, notably inevitable foreclosures.”). 
 142 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (permitting an injunction to stop judicial proceedings or actions against the debtor, 
enforcement of judgments against the debtor or property of the estate, any act to obtain possession or exercise 
control over property, any act to create, perfect or enforce a lien, any act to collect, asses or recover a claim 
against the debtor, and setoff of any debt that arose before the commencement of the case); Boul, supra note 
141. 
 143 See, e.g., U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Ibanez, 941 N.E.2d 40 (Mass. 2011) (arguing the creditor failed to 
prove the chain of assignment); Intengan v. BAC Home Loans Servicing LP, 154 Cal. Rptr. 3d 727 (Ct. App. 
2013). 
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1. Authority to Foreclose and Difficulty Proving Chain of Assignment 
After the sharp increase in subprime lending in the early 1990’s, 
securitization became widespread. Mortgage securitization is a “process where 
thousands of mortgage loans are bundled together into financial products 
called mortgage-backed securities.”144 The securitization process begins with 
the initial ownership of the note by an entity known as the “sponsor,” who 
bundles together the mortgages and sells them to a subsidiary, known as a 
“depositor.”145 The second step involves selling the loans to a “trustee bank,” 
which holds the mortgages.146 Finally, the mortgages are divided by risk, and 
assigned a tranche level or rating based on that risk.147 After a risk level is 
assigned, a servicing entity purchases the income stream of the note, while the 
trustee bank retains legal interest.148 
The Pooling and Servicing Agreement (“PSA”), a public record filed 
through the United States Securities and Exchange Commission, governs the 
entire securitization process.149 The PSA identifies both a custodian, who 
retains possession of the note, and a servicer, who merely collects money for 
the trustee from the homeowner’s mortgage payments.150 While the PSA sets 
out the rules for the bundling of mortgages, the Master Loan Schedule is the 
document that lists the specific mortgages that were transferred into the trust; 
the Master Loan Schedule is not a public record.151 
During this securitization process, the note is transferred numerous times, 
and at the end, the trustee bank holds the final legal interest of the note “for the 
benefit of the securities holder,” or servicing entity.152 While the trustee bank 
 
 144 Roy D. Oppenheim, Deconstructing the Black Magic of Securitized Trusts: How the Mortgage-Backed 
Securitization Process Is Hurting the Banking Industry’s Ability to Foreclose and Proving the Best Offense for 
a Foreclosure Defense, 41 STETSON L. REV. 745, 753–54 (2012) (quoting Richard Bitner, Confessions of a 
Sub-Prime Lender: An Insider’s Tale of Greed, Fraud, and Ignorance 23–24 (2008)); see LEON T. KENDALL 
ET AL., A PRIMER ON SECURITIZATION 2 (Leon T. Kendall & Michael J. Fishman eds., 2000). 
 145 Oppenheim, supra note 144, at 753–54. 
 146 Id. at 754. 
 147 A tranche is a risk level assigned to the pool. The larger the risk, the larger the potential pay-off. Id. 
Home mortgages backed by Government-Sponsored Entities (“GSEs”), such as Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac, 
do not require a rating. KENDALL ET AL., supra note 144, at 4.  
 148 Joseph C. Shenker & Anthony J. Colletta, Asset Securitization: Evolution, Current Issues and New 
Frontiers, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1369, 1376 (1991).  
 149 Adam J. Levitin & Tara Twomey, Mortgage Servicing, 28 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 31 (2011).  
 150 Oppenheim, supra note 144, at 758. 
 151 Id. at 757 (citing Stephen S. Kudenholdt et. al, The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court Foreclosure 
Decisions: The Impact on the Securitization Documentation Process, 128 BANKING L.J. 195, 197 (2011)). 
 152 Morgan v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, 795 F. Supp. 2d 1370, 1374–75 (N.D. Ga. 2011).  
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holds the legal interest of the note, the investor of the securities, or the servicer, 
owns the income stream from the note, not the legal interest of the note 
itself.153 
Due to the rapid rise of mortgage-backed securities, the financial industry 
sought to maximize time, effort, and resources by developing many structures 
to support these financial products, a major one being the creation of the 
MERS, operated by MERSCORP Holdings, Inc.,154 which “establish[ed] a 
centralized, electronic system for registering the assignments and sales of 
residential mortgages.”155 At the initial stage of a real estate property sale, the 
borrower and lender list MERS on the security deed as nominee for the lender 
and the lender’s successors and assigns.156 MERS then holds the mortgage on 
behalf of all subsequent interests of the loan, tracking the transfer of the 
beneficial interests of the loan as well as changes in the loan servicing 
entity.157 While the security deed lists MERS, often the note lists a separate 
entity, the servicing company, who has an interest in the payments received 
from the borrower, or the income stream of the note.158 Upon default, courts 
look to applicable state property and foreclosure law to determine which entity 
has the authority to foreclose on the property. 
Most jurisdictions today reject a debtor’s defense based on the invalidity of 
the listing of different entities on the deed and note, also known as “note-
splitting”; however, some jurisdictions still maintain that both instruments 
must be held together and list the same entity to establish legal authority to 
foreclose.159 This disparity in the jurisdictions regarding the validity of MERS 
and the note-splitting theory is detrimental to the uniformity of bankruptcy 
decisions in regard to prepetition foreclosure sales. Not only are courts varying 
 
 153 Shenker & Colletta, supra note 148, at 1376.  
 154 About Us, MERS, https://www.mersinc.org/about-us/about-us (last visited Jan. 5, 2015). 
 155 Taylor, Bean & Whitaker v. Brown, 583 S.E.2d 844, 845 n.1 (Ga. 2003). MERS now holds over 60 
million mortgages in the United States. Michael Powell & Gretchen Morgenson, MERS? It May Have 
Swallowed Your Loan, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/06/business/06mers.html. 
 156 Morgan, 795 F. Supp. 2d at 1375 n.5; see Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation Authorized 
Changes for MERS, FREDDIE MAC, available at http://www.freddiemac.com/uniform/doc/unifmersauth.doc 
(last updated June 2014). 
 157 Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1038–39 (9th Cir. 2011); Phyllis K. 
Slesinger & Daniel McLaughlin, Mortgage Electronic Registration System, 31 IDAHO L. REV. 805, 808 (1995). 
 158 Morgan, 795 F. Supp. 2d at 1374–75. 
 159 States that have rejected the note-splitting defense theory include, but are not limited to: California 
(taking different positions in both state and federal court in Ferguson v. Avelo Mortgage, LLC, 126 Cal. Rptr. 
3d 586, 592–93 (Ct. App. 2011) (depublished) and U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Skelton (In re Salazar), 448 B.R. 
814, 823 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 2011)), Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada, 
North Dakota, South Carolina, Texas, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin.  
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in their final determinations, but, often, debtors use this disparity in state 
foreclosure and property law to fraudulently avoid their mortgage obligations 
and prolong the bankruptcy distribution process.160 
In one case, In re Agard, the Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of 
New York held that MERS did not have authority to assign the note even 
though the note named MERS as a nominee.161 The court came to that 
conclusion stating, “MERS is not a party to the Note and the record is barren 
of any representation that MERS, the purported assignee, had any authority to 
take any action with respect to the Note.”162 On appeal, the district court found 
that the bankruptcy court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, and, therefore, 
inappropriately reached the question of MERS’s authority to assign a note.163 
Similarly, in Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals held, “The deed and note must be held together because the 
holder of the note is only entitled to repayment [by the terms of the note], and 
does not have the right under the deed to use the property as a means of 
satisfying repayment.”164 In Cervantes, the Ninth Circuit was applying Arizona 
law. Nevada165 and Washington166 courts have since expressly rejected the 
ruling in Cervantes and declined to accept the note-splitting theory on state-
law grounds. 
One New York Appellate Court, in Bank of New York v. Silverberg, went 
as far as to state that MERS was never a lawful holder of the note and therefore 
had no power to assign the authority to foreclose.167 The court reasoned that 
 
 160 See supra notes 141–42 and accompanying text.  
 161 444 B.R. 231, 246, 251–52 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2011), vacated in part sub nom., Agard v. Select 
Portfolio Servicing, Inc., No. 11-CV-1826, 2012 WL 1043690 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2012). 
 162 Id. at 246 (citing In re Mims, 438 B.R. 52 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010)); see Mims, 438 B.R. 52 (“[A]s a 
mortgage is but an incident to the debt which it is intended to secure, the logical conclusion is that a transfer of 
the mortgage without the debt is a nullity, and no interest is acquired from the debt, and exist independently of 
it.” (quoting Merritt v. Bartholick, 36 N.Y. 44, 45 (1867))). 
 163 Agard, 2012 WL 1043690, at *11–12 (“The issue of whether MERS had authority to assign the 
Mortgage was no longer before the bankruptcy court.”). 
 164 656 F.3d 1034, 1039 (9th Cir. 2011).  
 165 See Aboulafia v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., No. 2:12-cv-02001, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81220, at 
*10–11 (D. Nev. June 8, 2013) (explicitly rejecting application of Cervantes); Trombly v. Truckee Meadows 
Funding Inc., No. 3:11-CV-0285, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 903, at *3 (D. Nev. Jan. 3, 2012) (“Nevada law does 
not require the production of the original note before one of the statutorily enumerated parties initiates a non-
judicial foreclosure.” (citing Weingartner v. Chase Home Fin., LLC, 702 F. Supp. 2d 1276, 1280 (D. Nev. 
2010))). 
 166 See Bavand v. OneWest Bank, F.S.B., 309 P.3d 636, 648 & n.88 (Wash. Ct. App. 2013) (declining to 
apply Cervantes because the ruling did not address Washington law). 
 167 926 N.Y.S.2d 532, 539 (App. Div. 2011).  
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even if MERS is a nominee for recording purposes, it does not retain title to 
the note and a transfer of the mortgage without the debt is a nullity.168 
Therefore, because MERS could only assign that to which it was entitled, and 
since it was never entitled to foreclose, it could not assign the power to 
foreclose.169 
In contrast, in In re Tucker, the Bankruptcy Court of Missouri found that 
MERS retained legal title as nominee for the lender, allowing for future 
assignments.170 In Tucker, the note and the deed identified the mortgage 
company, New Century, with the deed of trust naming MERS as the nominee 
for New Century.171 The note was assigned numerous times before the debtor 
filed for bankruptcy.172 After the filing, MERS assigned the deed of trust to the 
loan servicing company, Aurora, who later filed for relief from the automatic 
stay.173 The court held that Aurora was entitled to enforce both the note and the 
deed of trust because it held the defaulted note, even though it both split the 
instruments and did not hold the deed of trust on the date of the bankruptcy 
filing.174 
Georgia is one of many states that rejects a debtor’s note-splitting theory 
defense, and Georgia courts have long ruled that separation of these 
instruments does not render them void.175 Yet up until recently, there was still 
ongoing confusion as to which party had the right or authority to foreclose—
either the holder of the deed or the holder of the promissory note.176 In a recent 
Georgia Supreme Court opinion, You v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, the court 
answered the question of who has the authority to foreclose: the entity named 
on the deed or the entity named on the note.177 The court first looked to the 
plain language of the statute,178 but more importantly, to Georgia common law, 
which allowed for a “non-judicial foreclosure conducted by one who held legal 
 
 168 Id. at 537. 
 169 Id. at 539. 
 170 441 B.R. 638, 644–46 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2010). 
 171 Id. at 640. 
 172 Id. 
 173 Id. 
 174 Id. at 647. 
 175 See Boaz v. Latson, 580 S.E.2d 572, 578 (Ga. 2003), rev’d on other grounds, 598 S.E.2d 485 (Ga. 
2004); see also White v. First Nat’l Bank of Claxton, 162 S.E. 701, 707 (Ga. 1932).  
 176 See Reese v. Provident Funding Assocs., LLP, 730 S.E.2d 551, 555 (Ga. App. 2012), abrogated by, 
You v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 743 S.E.2d 428 (Ga. 2013).  
 177 743 S.E.2d at 429.  
 178 Id. (citing GA. CODE ANN. § 44-14-162.2 (2013)). 
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title to the property, but not the underlying note.”179 Looking to § 44-14-64(b) 
of the Georgia Code,180 the court held that a holder of a security deed has full 
authority to exercise power of sale on default, even if that entity does not also 
have possession of the note.181 
In addition to challenging the validity of MERS and its process of 
assigning mortgages, homeowners and trustees have frequently attempted to 
litigate and avoid real estate foreclosure sales, respectively, based on an 
arguable lack of authority due to a gap in the chain of mortgage 
assignments.182 State courts and law differ drastically on the specific 
requirements of proving a chain of assignments. 
The Massachusetts Supreme Court, in U.S. Bank National Ass’n v. Ibanez, 
noted the requirement of producing the chain of assignments and addressed the 
issue of whether the securitization trustee had the authority to foreclose, 
specifically, whether the foreclosures complied with state law in respect to the 
assignments made after the foreclosure sale.183 After the foreclosure sale, the 
trustee attempted to obtain title insurance and was denied because of questions 
regarding the authority and validity of the sale.184 The court held that the 
trustee did not possess the authority to foreclose because it could not show that 
it held the mortgage.185 The court went on to explain that a foreclosing entity is 
required to prove a complete chain of assignments.186 The court applied the 
decision both retroactively and prospectively, stating that the ruling did not 
make significant changes to common law.187 
The rule in Ibanez has since been narrowed, no longer requiring “a physical 
possession of the mortgage note in order to effect a valid foreclosure” in all 
circumstances.188 In Christiansen v. Bank of America, the Middle District of 
 
 179 You, 743 S.E.2d at 431 (citing White, 162 S.E. 701).  
 180 GA. CODE ANN. § 44-14-64(b) (2013) (“Transfers of deeds to secure debt . . . shall be sufficient to 
transfer the property therein described and the indebtedness therein secured.”).  
 181 You, 743 S.E.2d at 433. 
 182 See supra notes 169–79. 
 183 941 N.E.2d 40 (Mass. 2011).  
 184 Id. 
 185 Id. at 49–50. (“One who sells under a power of sale must follow strictly its terms. If he fails to do so, 
there is no valid execution of the power and the sale is wholly void.”).  
 186 Id. at 53. 
 187 Id. at 55 (“The legal principles and requirements we set forth are well established in our case law and 
our statutes. All that has changed is the plaintiff’s apparent failure to abide by those principles and 
requirements in the rush to sell mortgage-backed securities.”).  
 188 Eaton v. Fannie Mae, 462 Mass. 569, 586 (2012). 
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Tennessee explained in clearer terms that although the entity entitled to enforce 
a note may be required to produce the note, the entity need not produce the 
note to enforce it if the borrower has waived his rights to presentment by the 
terms of the instrument.189 
The authority to foreclose due to the MERS and securitization process is 
one of the most inconsistent areas of foreclosure and property law among the 
states. As explained in this Part, during the securitization process the trustee 
bank continues to hold the legal interest of the note, while the investor or 
servicer owns and holds only the income stream of the note.190 Requiring a 
complete chain of assignments is not necessary since what is transferred is not 
the note, but the income stream.191 The proposed amendment to the Code in 
Part II.A of this Comment, requiring substantial compliance with state law, 
would clarify this intersection of bankruptcy, foreclosure, and property law; 
reduce costly and inefficient litigation; and assist in keeping over $6.5 trillion 
of securitized mortgage debt192 secured. 
2. Shocking the Judicial Conscience 
In addition to the inconsistencies regarding the validity of MERS and 
requirements of proving a chain of assignments, state law also differs greatly 
on how to gauge whether a foreclosure sale price is too low. BFP made clear a 
foreclosure sale may be set aside under state foreclosure law if the price is so 
low as to “shock the conscience or raise a presumption of fraud or 
unfairness.”193 Even though BFP stated the price paid at a foreclosure sale is 
considered reasonably equivalent value under § 548, the “so low as to shock 
the conscience” loophole remains.194 Currently, no court has defined what 
exactly “shocks the judicial conscience,” and courts have failed to even note 
relevant factors used to determine what is “shocking” and whether market 
conditions would alter previous rulings. 
Since 2005, the fair market value of residential real estate has dropped, in 
some states significantly, which may drastically affect the price that would 
 
 189 No. 3:11-cv-00935, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4731, at *4–6 (M.D. Tenn. Jan. 10, 2013).  
 190 See supra notes 148–53 and accompanying text. 
 191 See supra notes 148–53 and accompanying text; see also Shenker & Colletta, supra note 148, at 1376–
78, 1392 (detailing the process of securitization). 
 192 Austin Hall, Property: Mortgages, Conveyances to Secured Debt, and Liens, 25 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 
265, 269 (2008).  
 193 511 U.S. 531, 542 (1993). 
 194 Id. 
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“shock the judicial conscience.” States in the hardest hit areas likely 
experience much lower bids at foreclosure sales than those states which have 
not suffered significant drops in price, making the “shock” factor inconsistent 
across state lines and often inconsistent even within the state.195 
For almost a century, courts’ susceptibility to “shock” relating to 
foreclosure prices has varied widely throughout the different circuits. In 
Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. v. Fineline Development, LLC, the trial 
court refused to set aside a bid of $100 when the second bid, coming in a day 
after the sale, was for over $80,000.196 The Arkansas Appellate Court reversed 
and remanded because the $100 bid “shock[ed] the judicial conscience” and 
was too low for a property with an unpaid principal balance of $112,500.61 
and a recent tax appraisal of $121,000.197 
New York courts have taken a percentage approach in determining what a 
“shocking” foreclosure sale price looks like, and have consistently held that 
foreclosure sales under ten percent of the fair market value are “shocking.”198 
In Central Trust Co. v. Alcon Developers, Inc., the court set aside a foreclosure 
sale that brought $1, but also stated a lack of proper notice and posting of the 
sale as contributing factors.199 Also in New York, sales above fifty percent of 
fair market value have been consistently upheld200 with no bright-line 
determined.201 In Long Island Savings Bank v. Jean Valiquette, the Court held 
that a fifty-seven percent foreclosure sale price was “not unconscionable”202 
and thirty percent was sufficient in Frank Buttermark Plumbing v. Sagarese.203 
New York courts have not provided a definitive figure as to what shocks the 
judicial conscience between the ten percent mark and the fifty percent mark. 
 
 195 Compare Long Island Sav. Bank v. Jean Valiquette, M.D., P. C., 584 N.Y.S.2d 127, 129 (App. Div. 
1992), with Frank Buttermark Plumbing & Heating Corp. v. Sagarese, 500 N.Y.S.2d 551, 551–52 (App. Div. 
1986). 
 196 Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co. v. Fineline Dev., LLC, 2013 Ark. App. 216, at 1–2, 2013 Ark. App. 
LEXIS 230, at *1–3 (2013). 
 197 Id.; cf. Looper v. Madison Guar. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 729 S.W.2d 156, 157, 161 (Ark. 1987) (rejecting 
a sale for 4.4 percent of the market value). 
 198 See, e.g., Cent. Trust Co. v. Alcon Developers, Inc., 403 N.Y.S.2d 396 (Sup. Ct. 1978). 
 199 Id. at 397. 
 200 In re 824 S.E. Blvd. Realty, Inc., No. 11-15728, 2012 Bankr. LEXIS 3823, at *25 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y 
Aug. 17, 2012) (citing Polish Nat’l Alliance of Brooklyn v. White Eagle Hall Co., 470 N.Y.S.2d 642, 649 
(App. Div. 1983)); see, e.g., Long Island Sav. Bank v. Jean Valiquette, M.D., P.C., 584 N.Y.S.2d 127, 129 
(App. Div. 1992). 
 201 See Frank Buttermark Plumbing & Heating Corp. v. Sagarese, 500 N.Y.S.2d 551, 552 (App. Div. 
1986) (upholding a sale at thirty percent of fair market value). 
 202 584 N.Y.S.2d at 129. 
 203 500 N.Y.S.2d at 552. 
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The Mississippi Supreme Court has stated the “rule of thumb” in 
determining “judicial shock” is that the bid must be so inadequate that it would 
be “impossible to state it to a man of common sense without producing an 
exclamation at the inequality of it”204 or “about forty percent.”205 In Central 
Financial Services, Inc. v. Spears, the Mississippi Supreme Court recognized 
the fact that a depression or recession may have a large bearing on the amount 
that “shocks the judicial conscience,” stating that “[w]e also note that most of 
the cases cited . . . involved sales during a time of economic depression” and 
many of these sales were deemed adequate because the entire country “was in 
the throes of a depression.”206 
South Carolina courts have a less “shocking” standard, allowing a 
foreclosure sale to be set aside if the price is “inadequate and this inadequacy 
is accompanied by other circumstances.”207 In Eastern Savings Bank, FSB v. 
Sanders, the South Carolina Court of Appeals recognized South Carolina’s 
lesser standard for setting aside a sale, explicitly distinguishing the state’s 
approach from that of New York.208 
In Alabama, in Berry v. Deutsch Bank, the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals 
considered a foreclosure sale that brought $33,915 when the market value was 
$84,800.209 In that case, the dissent argued that previous Alabama decisions 
showed that a sale yielding only one-third of the market price is the “shocking” 
limit.210 However, the majority stated that while this number could shock the 
conscience, the evidence submitted was insufficient to prove the value of the 
property.211 
In summary, the states are so divided as to what price would “shock the 
judicial conscience” that courts sometimes, even in the same jurisdiction, 
cannot agree. New York holds ten percent too low and fifty percent sufficient, 
 
 204 Cent. Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Spears, 425 So. 2d 403, 405 (Miss. 1983). 
 205 Fleisher v. S. AgCredit, FLCA, 2010-CA-01594-COA (¶17) (Miss. Ct. App. 2012) (citing Weyburn v. 
Watkins, 44 So. 145, 145–146 (Miss. 1907)). 
 206 425 So. 2d at 405. 
 207 E. Sav. Bank, FSB v. Sanders (In re E. Sav. Bank, FSB), 644 S.E.2d 802, 806 (S.C. Ct. App. 2007). 
 208 See id. at 807 (“New York courts consistently hold foreclosure sale bids of less than ten percent of the 
value are unconscionably low.” (citing Investors Sav. Bank v. Phelps, 397 S.E.2d 780, 782 (1990) (citing 
Polish Nat’l Alliance v. White Eagle Hall Co., 470 N.Y.S.2d 642, 649 (App. Div. 1983)))). 
 209 57 So. 3d 142, 145 (Ala. Civ. App. 2010). 
 210 Id. at 150 (Pittman, J., dissenting). 
 211 Id. at 146. 
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but the grey area between these two numbers is not clear.212 Alabama has 
suggested that one-third of the market value is sufficient.213 South Carolina 
follows the New York ten percent threshold approach, but also looks to the 
accompanying circumstances.214 Mississippi attempted to put a number on 
what would cause “a man of common sense” to find inequality of a foreclosure 
sale price, setting that threshold at about forty percent of the market value.215 
Mississippi also expressly recognized economic conditions such as the ongoing 
depression that would cause all of these jurisdictions to alter their “shock 
factor,” resulting in an even less clear test for adequacy, thereby making 
avoidance powers in a bankruptcy context inconsistent and unpredictable.216 
3. Notice Requirements 
The notice requirements contained in the state statutes are one of the most 
hotly contested areas of litigation surrounding foreclosures among non-judicial 
foreclosure states. In recent and highly controversial developments in Georgia, 
the court in You v. JP Morgan Chase Bank217 looked to the plain text of the 
foreclosure notice statute and abrogated a previous decision, Reese v. 
Provident Funding.218 Expanding the written requirements of § 44-14-162.2 of 
the Georgia Code, the Georgia Court of Appeals in Reese interpreted the 
statute such that a foreclosure notice required identification of the secured 
creditor and the person with full authority to negotiate or modify the terms of 
the note.219 The court reasoned that a foreclosure notice that “misidentified the 
secured creditor” was misleading and “violates the spirit and intent of [§ 44-
14-162.2 of the Georgia Code],” which is to provide transparency in the 
foreclosure process.220 The court expressed its view that requiring the identity 
of a secured creditor is a “simple requirement, and one that does not impose an 
 
 212 824 S.E. Blvd. Realty, Inc. v. Ryan (In re 824 S.E. Blvd. Realty, Inc.), No. 11-15728, 2012 Bankr. 
LEXIS 3823, at *25 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 2012); see Long Island Sav. Bank v. Jean Valiquette, M.D., P. C., 584 
N.Y.S.2d 127, 129 (App. Div. 1992); Frank Buttermark Plumbing & Heating Corp. v. Sagarese, 500 N.Y.S.2d 
551, 552 (App. Div. 1986), Cent. Trust Co. v. Alcon Developers, Inc., 403 N.Y.S.2d 396 (Sup. Ct. 1978). 
 213 See Berry, 57 So. 3d at 150 (Pittman, J., dissenting). 
 214 E. Sav. Bank, FSB v. Sanders (In re E. Sav. Bank, FSB), 644 S.E.2d 802, 806–7 (S.C. Ct. App. 2007). 
 215 Fleisher v. S. AgCredit, FLCA, 2010-CA-01594-COA (¶17) (Miss. Ct. App. 2012) (following 
Weyburn v. Watkins, 44 So. 145, 145–46 (Miss. 1907)). 
 216 Cent. Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Spears, 425 So. 2d 403, 405 (Miss. 1983). 
 217 743 S.E.2d 428 (Ga. 2013). 
 218 730 S.E.2d 551 (Ga. Ct. App. 2012). 
 219 Id. at 554–55.  
 220 Id. at 555 & n.7 (“[A] debtor has a right to know which entity has the authority to foreclose, and there 
should be no confusion about the identity of that entity.”). 
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undue burden on the banks.”221 It then went on to state that the debtor was 
entitled to summary judgment, establishing precedent to allow a misleading 
foreclosure notice to be determined through summary judgment.222 
In 2013, the Georgia Supreme Court abrogated Reese and held that a 
secured creditor did not need to be identified in the foreclosure notice.223 
Because the language of the statute only required identification of the 
individual or entity with full authority to modify the note, the court held that 
only that entity needs to be named.224 That entity could be construed as the 
holder of the security deed, the holder of the note, an attorney, or a servicing 
agent.225 No matter which entity it may be, the one with full authority to 
modify the note is the only entity or individual that the statute requires listing 
on the foreclosure notice.226 This answer avoided the fiasco of having to 
determine who exactly the secured creditor was.227 
Looking to other decisions, Georgia courts require lenders to substantially 
comply with these stringent notice and procedural requirements.228 In Stowers 
v. Branch Banking & Trust Co.,229 the Georgia Court of Appeals confirmed its 
standard stating, “[S]ubstantial compliance with the notice provision of [§ 44-
14-162.2 of the Georgia Code] is sufficient.”230 
4. Procedural Defects in a Foreclosure Sale and the Substantial-
Compliance Standard 
The proposed amendment limiting avoidance based on state law to 
foreclosure sales that fail to substantially comply with state law will balance 
the federal interests and the “long-established traditions”231 of deference to 
state law. It will also expand the safe harbor allowed by many states for sales 
that substantially comply with procedural laws. 
 
 221 Id. at 555. 
 222 Id. 
 223 You v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 743 S.E.2d 428, 430 (Ga. 2013). 
 224 Id. at 433–34. 
 225 Id. 
 226 GA. CODE ANN. § 44-14-162.2 (2014).  
 227 You, 743 S.E.2d at 434 & n.7. Arguably the secured creditor could be defined as the lender, the 
servicer, Fannie Mae, MERS, etc.  
 228 See, e.g., TKW Partners, LLC v. Archer Capital Fund, L.P., 691 S.E.2d 300, 302 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010).  
 229 731 S.E.2d 367, 368 (Ga. Ct. App. 2012).  
 230 Id. at 369 (citing TKW Partners, LLC, 691 S.E.2d at 303) (recognizing its decision in TKW Partners, 
LLC but refusing to apply the it retroactively). 
 231 See BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 546 (1994). 
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In many states, purely procedural defects, absent other factors, typically 
will not be sufficient as a basis for invalidating or avoiding a foreclosure sale. 
California courts, as exemplified in Residential Capital v. Cal-Western 
Reconveyance Corp., only require a foreclosure to be free of substantial defects 
in procedure.232 The court stated that while a defect might make a sale 
voidable, it does not make it void.233 The court went on to suggest that a 
mandatory statutory provision, when ignored or not complied with, is a 
substantial defect.234 
By contrast, in Georgia, procedural irregularities do not render a 
foreclosure sale void.235 The determining factor is the requirement that the sale 
price was “not chilled.”236 In Stripling v. Farmers & Merchants Bank, the court 
held that a failure to advertise the sale for the four weeks required under the 
state statute does not render the sale void absent proof of a chilled price bid.237 
C. Collusive Sales 
The BFP court held that consideration received in a noncollusive 
foreclosure sale satisfies the reasonably equivalent value requirement of 
§ 548.238 Sales found to be “collusive” are still subject to the avoidance powers 
of a trustee and should remain so. If the proposed amendments in Part II.A 
were enacted, collusive foreclosure sales would remain subject to avoidance 
based on § 548(a)(1)—the “actual fraud” provision. For public policy reasons, 
courts have long admonished a lender or other party in restricting the 
opportunity for “full and free” bidding in a foreclosure sale by means of fraud 
or collusion.239 
 
 232 134 Cal. Rptr. 2d 162, 173 (Ct. App. 2003). 
 233 Id. at 167 (citing Little v. CFS Serv. Corp., 233 Cal. Rptr. 923, 924 (Ct. App. 1987)). 
 234 Id. 
 235 See Stripling v. Farmers & Merchs. Bank, 332 S.E.2d 373, 374 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985). 
 236 Id. (“[N]ot every irregularity furnishes a basis for voiding a foreclosure sale. The crucial point of the 
inquiry on confirmation is to insure that the sale was not chilled and the price bid was in fact market value.”); 
see also Cummings v. Anderson (In re Cummings), 173 B.R. 959 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1994); Walker v. Ne. Prod. 
Credit Ass’n, 251 S.E.2d 92, 92 (Ga. Ct. App. 1978); Shantha v. W. Ga. Nat’l Bank, 244 S.E.2d 643, 644 (Ga. 
Ct. App. 1978).  
 237 332 S.E.2d at 374–75. 
 238 511 U.S. 531, 545 (1993).  
 239 Detroit Trust Co. v. Agozzinio, 273 N.W. 747, 748 (Mich. 1937); CitiMortgage, Inc. v. Giordano, 791 
N.Y.S.2d 454, 455 (App. Div. 2005); Polish Nat’l Alliance v. White Eagle Hall Co., 470 N.Y.S.2d 642, 650 
(App. Div. 1983) (citing Manhattan Taxi Serv. Corp. v. Checker Cab Mfg. Corp., 171 N.E. 705 (N.Y. 1930)).  
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Collusion, as defined by Black’s Law Dictionary, is “[a]n agreement to 
defraud another or to do or obtain something forbidden by law.”240 Collusive 
sales are more akin to actual fraud under § 548(a)(1), “actual intent to hinder, 
delay or defraud [creditors].” In fact, the BFP decision directly referred to 
collusive sales as being “subject to attack under § 548(a)(1).”241 Collusion, 
similar to actual fraud, can take the form of price-fixing arrangements between 
a third-party bidder or other activities that “chill the bid” as required in 
Stripling.242 For a court to deem a foreclosure sale collusive, there must be 
evidence the price was subjected to “bid rigging or some other form of price 
fixing.”243 
Collusion in a foreclosure sale also will often take the form of 
arrangements between a borrower and a senior lender to foreclose for the 
purpose of wiping out a junior lien.244 Although, in this instance, a debtor 
would still have a debt obligation to the junior lien holder,245 the junior lien 
holder’s interest in the collateral would be extinguished.246 In bankruptcy, the 
junior lien holder would change from secured to unsecured and would likely 
receive a pro rata distribution, if any at all. Avoiding a foreclosure sale under 
these circumstances would be equitable and fulfill the bankruptcy policy of fair 
and equitable distribution under the Code.247 
Additionally, avoidance based on collusion or actual fraud is consistent 
with the UFTA. The UFTA, which based its avoidance power on § 548, allows 
for a safe harbor for reasonably equivalent value in foreclosure sales, very 
similar to the ruling in BFP; however, the safe harbor does apply to foreclosure 
 
 240 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 300 (9th ed. 2009). 
 241 BFP, 511 U.S. at 545 (“Although collusive foreclosure sales are likely subject to attack under 
§ 548(a)(1), which authorizes the trustee to avoid transfers ‘made . . . with the actual intent to hinder, delay, or 
defraud’ creditors, that provision may not reach foreclosure sales that, while not intentionally fraudulent, 
nevertheless fail to comply with all governing state laws.”). 
 242 Stripling, 332 S.E.2d at 374–75; see Stark, supra note 121, at 583.  
 243 718 Arch St. Assocs. v. Blatstein (In re Blatstein), 226 B.R. 140 (E.D. Pa. 1998) (quoting Bennett v. 
Genoa Ag Center, Inc. (In re Bennett), 154 B.R. 140, 147 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1992)), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 
192 F.3d 88 (3rd Cir. 1999). 
 244 Stark, supra note 121, at 576. 
 245 See, e.g., Trs. of MacIntosh Condo. Ass’n v. FDIC, 908 F. Supp. 58, 64 (D. Mass. 1995) (“As a result 
of the first mortgage foreclosure the second mortgage lien was extinguished but not the second mortgage 
debt.’” (quoting Osborne v. Burke, 300 N.E.2d 450, 451 (Mass. App. Ct. 1973))).  
 246 Levenson v. G.E. Capital Mortg. Servs., Inc., 643 A.2d 505, 512 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1994), rev’d on 
other grounds, 657 A.2d 1170 (Md. 1995).  
 247 In re Winshall Settlor’s Trust, 758 F.2d 1136, 1139 n.4 (6th Cir. 1985); 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, 
supra note 15, at ¶ 1100.01. 
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sales with “actual fraud” present.248 Maintaining avoidance based on collusion 
or actual fraud is consistent with the Supreme Court’s ruling in BFP,249 the 
UFTA,250 and the intent of Congress.251 The proposed amendments in Part II.A 
of this Comment reflect these intentions while keeping intact the policy and 
procedure of avoiding residential foreclosure sales that are based on collusion 
or actual fraud under § 548(a)(1)(A). 
CONCLUSION 
While the Code explicitly allows a trustee to avoid a prepetition foreclosure 
sale based on actual fraud under § 548(a)(1)(A)252 or constructive fraud under 
§ 548(a)(1)(B),253 Congress failed to define reasonably equivalent value in the 
Code.254 For many decades, this left courts to determine reasonably equivalent 
value on their own. Some jurisdictions used a percentage approach,255 others a 
rebuttable presumption,256 and still others considered the totality of the 
circumstances.257 Finally, the Supreme Court spoke in BFP, stating that the 
consideration received at a noncollusive foreclosure sale satisfies the 
reasonably equivalent value requirement of § 548(a)(1)(B).258 
Since the Supreme Court has spoken on the subject, the Code should be 
amended accordingly to incorporate the ruling in BFP. Because BFP expressly 
left open the possibility of a foreclosure sale being avoided for lack of state 
law compliance,259 the Code should also be amended to require substantial 
compliance with state law. The Court incorrectly described the relationship 
between state law and fraudulent transfer law as a “peaceful coexistence,”260 
and the Code must be amended to reflect the less-than-peaceful reality. 
 
 248 UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT §3(b) (1984) (“A person gives a reasonably equivalent value if the 
person acquires an interest of the debtor in an asset pursuant to a regularly conducted, noncollusive foreclosure 
sale or execution of a power of sale under a mortgage, deed or trust, or security agreement.”). 
 249 511 U.S. 531, 545–46 (1994).  
 250 See supra Part I.B.  
 251 See supra note 2 and accompanying text.  
 252 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1)(A) (2012).  
 253 Id. § 541(a)(1)(B). 
 254 See supra note 17.  
 255 Durrett v. Wash. Nat’l Ins. Co., 621 F.2d 201, 203 (5th Cir. 1980).  
 256 Lawyers Title Ins. Corp. v. Madrid (In re Madrid), 21 B.R. 424, 426–27 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1982), aff’d 
on other grounds, 725 F.2d 1197 (9th Cir. 1984).  
 257 Bundles v. Baker (In re Bundles), 856 F.2d 815, 825 (7th Cir. 1988).  
 258 511 U.S. 531, 545 (1994).  
 259 Id. at 545–46.  
 260 Id. at 542.  
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In its most recent amendments, Congress made its intentions clear that it 
desired to remedy debtor abuse and give additional protection to secured 
creditors.261 The UFTA did exactly this, but the Code was never amended to 
fully reflect the creditor protections in the UFTA. The majority of states have 
adopted the UFTA,262 and both Congress and the Supreme Court have made 
their intentions known with respect to mortgage lenders in the Code and in 
BFP, respectively. Therefore, secured creditors, especially mortgage lenders, 
should be given the right to secure their collateral, absent actual fraud, without 
fear of avoidance during a bankruptcy case. 
Although state law inconsistencies are too great to list, the effect of those 
inconsistencies is significant. One of the most litigated matters in foreclosure 
proceedings involves the debate over MERS, mortgage securitization, and 
which entity has the right to foreclose after a mortgage note is split from the 
deed. Another matter subject to litigation is the foreclosure sale price. BFP left 
the option of avoiding a sale if it “shocks the conscience,”263 even though this 
standard is not stated anywhere in the Code. The assessment of what price 
“shocks the conscience” is also inconsistent among the states, and even 
inconsistent within jurisdictions. Finally, the costs of focusing judicial 
resources on enforcing compliance with foreclosure notice statutes outweigh 
the benefits that those statutes offer. The purpose of foreclosure notice statutes 
is often to obtain transparency in the foreclosure process, but the notice 
requirements in many state statutes have the opposite effect, confusing both the 
debtor and the lender, and leading to a waste of judicial time and depreciation 
of the value of collateral during the process. 
Establishing a substantial-compliance standard for state law avoidance 
would codify the practice that some states already follow. As discussed, many 
courts do not find procedural defects in a foreclosure sale sufficient to serve as 




 261 McLaughlin, supra note 2, at 379 (“One of the 1984 Amendments many purposes was stopping 
consumer abuse of the Code. Critics of the 1978 Code believed that debtors abused the Code’s liberal 
provisions to discharge payable debts.”). See generally Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer 
Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23. 
 262 Supra note 44. 
 263 511 U.S. at 542.  
 264 See, e.g., Residential Capital, LLC v. Cal-Western Reconveyance Corp., Cal. Rptr. 2d 162, 173 (Ct. 
App. 2003); Stripling v. Farmers & Merchs. Bank, 332 S.E.2d 373, 374 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985).  
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law would respect the intentions of Congress and the Supreme Court and 
would offer creditors and debtors more protection. 
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